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ABSTRACT 
Effectivity frames are introduced as a model of what groups of 
agents can achieve by coordinated action in dynamic processes such 
as extensive games with or without simultaneous moves. Local 
effectivity is distinguished from different kinds of global and 
terminal effectivity, respectively what groups of players can 
maintain throughout and what they can achieve eventually. 
Examples are provided of how effectivity frames can be used as a 
tool (1) to model complex multi-agent processes Sl1ch as voting 
procedures, (2) to investigate the interplay between local and global 
properties of these dynamic procedures, and (3) to examine whether 
a particular effectivity function can be implemented or realized by a 
dynamic procedure of a specific type. Finally, a modal logic for 
local and global coalitional effectivity is presented, and it is shown 
how, for example, a realization question can be translated into this 
logical framework yielding a satisfiability problem. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Modelling actions and their effects is a task which has occupied many 
researchers in computer science, logic, economics and philosophy, In the 
simplest case, we have one agent (person, process) who can choose 
between taking different actions which change the state of the world in 
various ways. A simple model of this scenario will contain an 
accessibility relation R which associates to every state of the world all 
those states which the agent can bring about through his actions; i.e. sRt 
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holds if the agent can act in state s as to bring about state t. In modal 
logic, one introduces a language to talk about si1ch Kriplce models: Ocp 
expresses that the agent can act in such a way that c.p will be true after his 
action. 
When generalized to multiple agents, Kripke models do not suffice 
anyrnore. Instead I will employ effectivity functions (Moulin and Peleg, 
1982; Abdou and Keiding, 1991) which associate to every state and every 
group of agents C the sets of states for which C is effective. Since the 
resulting states can again be associated with an effectivity function, I 
obtain a dynamic model of what groups of agents can achieve by joint 
action. At each state of the model, local effectivity can be distinguished 
from different kinds of terminal effectivity: While a group of agents may 
not be able to bring about i.p immediately, the group may be able to 
achieve <p eventually. As I show in Section III, extensive games, 
nondeterministic processes and voting procedures can all be viewed as 
instances of these general e.[f'eclivity frames. Section IV illustrates some 
applications of the model; e.g. to a simple voting scenario. To describe 
effectivity frames, I use a modal logic presented in Section V. Properties 
of effectivity frames can be expressed as modal axioms, and questions 
about the existence of a particular procedure implementing a given 
effectivity function can be expressed as satisfiability problems. While I 
do not study the logic itself in the present paper, comments on some of 
its meta-theoretic properties are made in Section VI. 
A fragment of the logic discussed in this paper has first been 
introduced in Pauly (2000) which only dealt with local effectivity. The 
present paper deals also with global and terminal effectivity, witnessed 
by the addition of the [C*]cp modality to the logic. As will be argued, 
especially terminal effectivity is a concept which can be fruitfully applied 
in modelling, e.g. multistage voting procedures. 
II. A DYNAMIC MODEL OF EFFECTIVTTY 
II.J. Effectivity functions 
Throughout this paper, I assume that a nonempty finite set N of agents 
or players is given, as well as a nonempty set of states S. An effectivity 
junction E: 1P(N) -> ~(W'(S)) associates to every group of players the sets 
of outcomes for which the group is effective. For a coalition C ~ N, 
X E E(C) will hold iff the players in C have a joint strategy for bringing 
about an outcome in X. We shall require that effectivity functions are 
monotonic; i.e. X ~ Y ~ S implies that for every coalition C ~ N, if 
X E E(C) then YE E(C). Given the intuitions put forth, this requirement 
should be a natural one. 
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I present some further properties of effectivity functions which will 
play a role later: In many circumstances one will want to assume that a 
group which becomes larger has possibly more power but certainly not 
less. In that case, E is coalition-monotonic i.e. for C ~ C' k N, 
E(C) ~ E(C'). As a basic consistency requirement, we usually want to 
exclude cases where complementary coalitions are effective for com-
plementary things, for in that case, both coalitions could use their power 
and end up in an inconsistent situation. The notion of regularity captures 
this concern: Eis C-regu!ar if for all X, if X E E(C) then X rt E(C). As a 
converse to regularity, call E C-maxima! if for all X, if X ~ E(C) then 
X E E(C). Eis regular (maximal) iff for all coalitions C it is C-regular (C-
max.imal). If we think of a two-player game with two possible outcomes 
win1 and win2, regularity expresses that the game is zero-sum: If player l 
wins ({1} is effective for {wini}) then player 2 cannot wi11 ({2} is not 
effective for { win2} ). Similarly, maximality expresses determinacy: If 
player 1 does not win ({1} is not effective for {wini}) then player 2 must 
win ({2} is effective for {win2}). Finally, the most interesting principle 
governs the formation of coalitions. It states that coalitions can combine 
their strategies to (possibly) achieve more: E is superadditive if for all 
Xi, X2, C1, C2 such that C1nC2=0, X1 E E(C1) and X2 E E(C2) imply 
that X1 n X2 E £( C1 u C2). 
Effectivity functions have been investigated by, for example, Moulin 
and Peleg (1982), Abdou and Keiding (1991) and Peleg (1998}, and they 
find application in the theory of social choice (Moulin, 1983) where the 
agents are voters who try to force certain election outcomes. While 
effectivity functions are too crude to capture all aspects of a situation in 
which different agents interact (see also Section IV.3), they do capture 
the essential infomrntion about what power different groups of agents 
have. In the voting example to be discussed in Section IV.2, effectivity 
functions capture the allocation of veto power to individuals and 
coalitions. This analysis thus centres on what individuals and groups can 
achieve, independent of what they prefer to achieve. Clearly, in order to 
predict what agents will do in a particular strategic situation, their 
preferences need to be taken into account, and this could be done using 
the notion of the core of cffectivity functions. I will not pursue this line of 
investigation here since I feel that even wilhout incorporating playel's' 
preferences, the study of coalitional effectivity can yield some interesting 
results. 
While we consider any monotonic function E: <ll'(N) ~ PJ((!P(S)) to be 
an effectivity function, most of the literature has taken a more restrictive 
view, requiring E to satisfy Vltrious basic properties. The choice of these 
basic prnperties, however, is somewhat arbitrary, and this opinion is 
supported by the fact that authors differ in which basic properties they 
require. Here, I decided to be as general as possible regarding the notion 
of an effectivity function, requiring only monotonicity which is needed to 
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obtain proper definitions for the global and terminal effectivity functions 
to be defined below. 
II.2. E.ffectivity frames and structures 
The dynamic models of effectivity are captured by the notion of an 
eflectil'ity fi·ame :!Ji= (S, E), where S is the nonempty set of states and 
E: S......, (0'(N) - <!P(l!P(S))) is the local effectivity structure which associ-
ates to every states E San effectivity function E(s); i.e. X E E(s)( C) if at 
state s, coalition C is effective for the set of states X. Given that 
effectivity functions are linked to states and that the alternatives which 
can be brought about are states again, frames do present a dynamic 
model of effectivity. For easier readability, we shall often write sEcX 
instead of X E E(s)(C), and we will sometimes view the effectivity 
structure E as a collection of maps Ee : l!P(S)-; <!i'(S) with Ec(X) = 
{s ES I sEcX}. Monotonicity can now be formulated as the requirement 
that if X f;; X' then Ec(X) ~ Ec(X'). A state s where no coalition is 
effective for anything is called a terminal state; i.e. sis terminal iff there is 
no coalition C and no set of states X such that sEcX. We denote the set 
of terminal states {s ES\-, 3C3 YsEc Y} as SJ_. 
Lastly, note that all of the properties of effectivity functions 
introduced previously can be lifted to frames/structures: a frame (S, E) 
has a given property (e.g. maximality) iff every E(s) has it. 
JI.3. Globed and terminal eff'ectivity 
Given an effectivity frame gj' = (S, E) which contains information about 
effectivity at every state, we can also investigate effectiveness in the long 
run. For this, we define the global effectivity structure E* : S _,, 
(l!f'(N)--? 0'(C!/'(S))), where a coalition C is globally effective for X if it 
can maintain X throughout the game/process. Again, the global 
effectivity structure determines a (global) effectivity function E*(s) for 
every state s E S. Viewing E't as a function from W'(S) to gi(S), we 
define: 
ENZ)= LJ {X~ s IX(;;;; zn (S.L u Ec(X))}. 
By the Knaster-Tarski theorem, since Ee is a monotonic operator, 
E(.{Z) is the greatest fixpoint of the operator F~(X) = Z n (S.t U Ec(X)); 
i.e. F~(E~(Z)) =ENZ) and for every A ~ S such that F~(A) =A we 
have A~ ENZ). Using v-notation, we can write: 
E~(Z) = vX.F~(X) = vX.Z n (SJ. U Ec(X)) 
Intuitively, C is globally effective for X at state s ifs EX and C can 
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subsequently maintain X; i.e. if s is not a terminal state, C is locally 
effective for X. 
Often we are not interested in global effectivity generally but in 
terminal effectivity, the terminal states or final outcomes which a 
coalition can bring about. Analogous to program correctness two 
notions of effectivity can be distinguished. A coalition C is partially 
effective for X if it can guarantee X to hold at every terminating (i.e. 
finite) run of the game/process. Thus, the strategy for C may still lead to 
an infinite run. In contrast, C is totally effective for X if it is partially 
effective for X and can guarantee termination at the same time. 
Formally, define EP, E 1 : S ~ ('!l'(N) ~ (fp('!J'(S))) as the partial and total 
effectivity structures respectively as follows (where µX denotes the least 
fixpoin t): 
E~(X) = ENS1. u X) = vY.(S.t u X) n (S.t u Ec(Y)) 
E~(X) = 11.Y.(S1 n X) u Ec(Y). 
For total effectivity, we start with the terminal states which are in Xand 
iteratively add to them the states where C can guarantee an outcome 
among those states. For partial effectivity, we require that C is globally 
effective for S.t u X; i.e. C can maintain forcing states which are either 
nonterminal or in X. 
While effectivity frames do not fonnally distinguish a special initial 
state so, in the modelling applications we shall often assume such a 
distinguished initial state; consequently, for example, the total effectivity 
function associated to such a frame will denote the total effectivity 
function of the initial state of the frame. 
The following results capture the main relationships between global, 
partial and total effectivity. These results should be seen as general-
izations of Dijkstra's ( 1976) work which discusses the links between 
partial and total program correctness. 
Proposition 1: 
1. For every e!fectivity frame 'Jfr = (S, E), total effectivity implies partial 
effectivity; i.e. E~.(X) k E~.(X). 
2. For every superadditive ejfectMty.f'rame ~ = (S, E), at states where no 
infinite play is possible, partial effec:tMty implies total effectivity,· i.e. 
Ei?J(S) n E1~.(X) !:: E~.(X). 
3. For every C-regu/ar and C-maximal e.ffectivity.frame 'ffe = (S, E), total 
e.fJectiliity is the dual of pa1·tial effectivily; i.e. E~(X) == E~(X) = 
El:(S.t n X). 
Proof' (1) Let cg; = (S, E) be an effectivity frame. For any monotonic 
operator F: 0'>(S) ~ 9J>(S), define the upward and downward hierarchies 
© Blackwell Publishers Lld and the Board ol' Trustees oi' the Bulletin or Economic Research 200 I, 
310 
as follows: 
BULLETIN OF 8CONOMIC RESEARCH 
FT0=0 
FT x+I = F(FT K) 
FlO=S 
F l x:+ 1 = F(F l 11:) 
where r;. and ), are ordinals and ), is a limit ordinal. 
Given X t; S, let F1(Y) = (SJ_ n X) U Ee( Y) and Fµ(Y) = (SJ. U X) n 
(Sl u Ec(Y)). We show by transfinite induction that for all ordinals K, 
F, T It k Fj, l K. For the inductive step: 
F, T x+ I = (S.t n X) u Ec(F, T K) ~ (S.L u X) n (SJ. u Ec(Fp l "')) 
=Fpl11:+l 
using the induction hypothesis and monotonicity of Ee. For limit 
ordinals, the inductive step follows from the fact that for all It()<; K, 
FT~ r;;;; FT x and F l K !;;; F l /'i.o. Now to prove the first claim, if 
s E E~(X), there is some closure ordinal a such that for all /3 ;i. a:, 
s E F, T f3 and hence s E Fp l /3. Thus, for all ordinals "'f, s E Fp l "f, in 
particular for the closure ordinal 1'o for which Fj, l 'Yo = Fp(Fp l 10) = 
E~(X). 
(2) Let ?J = (S, E) be a superaddiLive effectivity frame, and let Fj(Y) = 
SJ. U E0 (J'). We show by induction that for all ordinals K, FrT"' n 
Fp l 11: k F, T l'i.. For the inductive step l'i. + 1, we must show that: 
In the case that s E £0(.Fj·T n:), s cannot be a terminal state and hence 
s E Ec(fi, lit). Hence, by superadditivity, s E Ec(F.r T If. n Fp lit) which by 
induction hypothesis and monotonicity implies that s E Ec(F1 T 11:). The 
rest of the proof is analogous to the proof of (1). 
(3) 
EE(SJ_ n X) = v Y.S.L n x n {S.L u Ee( Y)) 
= -.µ,Y.(SJ. n X) u (S.L n Er(Y)) 
= ..,µ,Y.(S.L n X) u {S.L n Ec(Y)) 
by C-tnaximality and regularity. Sirice Ec(Y) ~ S.t, the last formula 
indeed equals E~(X). O 
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Ill. SPECIAL EFFECTIVITY FRAMES: GAMES 
Effectivity frames generalize many dynamic game models used in game 
theory. Below I consider in particular two classes of games, namely 
extensive games with and without simultaneous moves (the latter are 
simply extensive games of perfect infomrntion). As a particular example 
of simultaneous move games, I consider also democratic voting 
procedures. Note that in the games discussed in this paper, players have 
perfect information modulo simultaneous moves; i.e. the only source of 
imperfect information are simultaneous moves. 
III.I. Extensive games with simultaneous moves 
In an extensive game form with simultaneous moves (Osborne and 
Rubinstein, 1994), players may act simultaneously at every stage of the 
game in order to determine the resulting game position. Formally, to 
obtain such a model, we associate a strategic game with every state of the 
world. A strategic game G = (N, n=i Ii EN}, o, S) consists of the set of 
agents N, a nonempty set of strategies or actions L;S; for every player 
i E N, the set of states s and an outcome function 0 : n, EN "Ei -7 s 
which associates with every tuple of strategies of the players (strategy 
profile) an outcome state in S. 
In game theory (Binmorc, 1992; Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994), 
strategic games also come equipped with a preference relation ~ 1 k S x S 
for every player i EN which indicates which outcomes a player prefers. 
Strictly speaking, our strategic games are only game forms which can be 
turned into a game by adding these preference relations. 
For notational convenience, let ere:= (a;); E c denote the strategy tup1e 
for coalition Ck N which consists of player i choosing strategy <:Jt E 'E;· 
Then given two strategy tu pies ac and ac (where C := N\ C), o(CTc, ere:) 
denotes the outcome state associated with the strategy profile induced by 
ac and ac. 
Let r 1 be the set of all strategic games between the sel of players N 
over the set of states S. Then we define an extensi\1e game (with 
simultaneous moves) as a partial function 'Y: S '-+ r~ which associates 
strategic games to nonterminal states. An example of such a game will be 
looked at in Section IV. I. 
The notion of effectivity which we associate with strategic games is known 
as a-effectivity, (Moulin and Peleg, 1982; Moulin, 1983; Abdou and 
Keiding, 1991 ). Given a game G, a coalition C ~ N will be cx.-effective for a 
set X ~ S iff lhe coalition has a joint strategy which will result in an outcome 
in X no matter what strategies the other players choose. Formally, the a-
ef/ectivity function E& : l!P(N) --t e?(eP(S)) of a strategic game G is defined as: 
X E Ec(C) iff 3acifac o(<:Jc, ac) EX 
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We say that an effectivity function E: C!P(N) ~ 2/'(Cfl'(S)) a:-corresponds to 
a strategic game Giff E= £ 0. Similarly, an effectivity frame ':!JP == (S, E) 
O!.-corresponds to an extensive game /: S <-> r~ provided that sEcX iff 
-y(s) is defined and X E E~(s)· 
The question to be examined now is which effectivity frames a-
correspond to some extensive game. Call an effectivity function 
E:P(N)-? l!J'('!J>(S)) playable iff it satisfies the;: following four conditions: 
(1) VC k N: 0 rf. E(C), (2) VC ~ N: SE E(C), (3) Eis N-maximal, and (4) 
E is superadditive. Proposition 2 below extends characterization results 
obtained in by Moulin (1983) and Peleg (1998). A proof can be found in 
Pauly (2000). 
Proposition 2: An ej/ectil'ily jimction E: rg">(N)-> ra>(<1.l'(S)) a-corresponds 
to a strategic game GE r~ (fj' Eis playable. 
Corollary I: An eflectivity ji·ame '§ = (S, E) C-'t-corresponds to an extensive 
game 'Y: S <-> r~ ijj'for every states st Si., E(s) is playable. 
I shall sometimes refer to an effectivity frame :1J' simply as an extensive 
game if it a:-corresponds to such a game. 
Claims (1) and (2) of Proposition 1 apply to extensive games, whereas 
claim (3) does not, since extensive games are not necessarily maximal. 
Consider, for example, the extensive game with simultaneous moves 
({so, s 1, s2, s3, s4}, /') where ')' is defined only for so yielding the strategic 
game depicted in Figure 1. 
Consider Lhe effectivily frame :ffe = (S, E) which a-corresponds to this 
extensive game. Note that E(so) is not maximal since the row player is 
not effective for {s1, s4} while the column player is not effective for 
{s0, s2, s3} either. Furthermore, while the row player is not totally 
effective for {s1, s4 } at s0, the column player is not partially effective for 
{so, s2, s3} either. 
IIJ.2. Extensive gmnes without simultaneous moves 
A special case of the extensive games discussed in the previous section 
arises if at every stage of the game, one of the players is in complete 
control in determining the next stage. In such an extensive game without 




Fig. 1. A nonmax.imal game where partial and Lota! effectivity are not duals 
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Formally, we call a strategic game G == (N, {L;i / i EN}, o, S'j a dictator-
ship iff there is some d E N such that: 
'rise ran(o)3,,.e1VaN\{dl o(o) = s 
In such a dictatorship, there is an individual d (the dictator) whose choices 
completely determine the outcome state, independent of what the others 
do. Note that in case there is more than one dictator, the outcome 
function is constant (i.e. 3sVa-o(a) = s) and hence every player is a dictator. 
Let Li~ be the set of aJI dictatorships for the set of players N over the 
set of states S. We define an extensive game without simultaneous moves 
as a partial function "!: S '----' t:.~ which associates dictatorships to 
nonterminal states. Note thal given an initial state, we can picture an 
extensive game without simultaneous moves as a standard game tree 
where nodes correspond to states which are labelled with the local 
dictator of that state; i.e. the phtyer who is to move at that state. Figure 2 
depicts an example. 
At state s0 , player l is the local dictator who has the local power to 
decide between states s1 and s2• Similarly at state s2, player 2 has the 
power to decide between states s3 and s4• Thus, states s0 and s2 are the 
nonterminal states to which "! associates the two dictatorships given i11 
the middle of Figure 2. The extensive game tree on the left can thus be 
viewed as a concise presentation of a sequence of local dictatorships. The 
example also shows that a sequence of local dictatorships need not result 
In a dictatorship overnll, as the strategic form or the extensive game 
illustrates where neither player is a dictator. Note that in case INI = 1 or 
In case the local dictator is the same at every state, the game is a one-
player game, or equivalently, a process. 
Call an effectivity function E: ifl'(N)-:. l!fl(C!P(S)) individualistic iff it is 
playable and E(N) = U;i; N E({i}). The condition ensures that everything 
which can be forced can be forced already by some individual. The 
following result (proved in Pauly, 2000) shows that individualism is an 
extremely strong assumplion: While it seems to say only that the whole is 
equal to the sum of its parts, due to supcradditivity, it actually says that 
the whole is equal to one particular part. 
1 so 
~'--... 1\2 1\2 1\2 1' l r l 81 2 82 St S1 81 
~~ 8;) 811 r S3 S4 r 82 
Fig. 2. An extensive game (left) without simultaneous moves which can be 
viewed as the sequential composition of two local dictatorships (middle); the 
strategic form of this extensive game (right} on the other hand is not ii 
dictatorship 
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Proposition 3:An ~[fer.:tivity .function E; <!J>(N)--i '!J'('lf'(S)) 0t·corresponds 
to a dictatorship GE .6.1 iff Eis individualistic. 
Put positively, unless we have a dictatorship, coalitions of agents can 
sometimes achieve more than their members individually; cooperation is 
thus advantageoi.1s. 
Corollary 2: An e.ffectivity frame '§i = (S, E) a-corresponds to an extensive 
game without simultaneous moves "(: S <-+ .6.1 iff for every states fj. SJ., 
E(s) is individualistic. 
Since individualistic effectivity functions are regular and maximal, all 
three claims of Proposition I apply to extensive games without 
simultaneous moves. 
IJI.3. Democracies 
Effectivity frames can also be utilized to model the power of coalitions in 
voting procedures. Consider a strategic game G = (N, {l::1 I l EN}, o, S) 
where I NI is odd, 2:; = {yes, no} for all i E N, and there are states 
Sy, s11 E S (we allow for Sy = s11 ) such that for every strategy profile a, 
o(cr) E {s.v, s11} and o(O') =Sy if I {O'; I a,= yes} I>! IN I and o(a) = S11 
otherwise. This strategic game con-esponds to a vote between two 
alternatives where each member of N participates and the outcome state 
is determined by the majority of the votes. We shall call such a voting 
game a two-alternative mcl)ority vote. Since an even number of voters 
creates the problem of how to resolve ties, we require IN I to be odd here. 
Nonetheless, this simple example should demonstrate how results for 
more elaborate 'democratic' voting procedures (e.g. including a 
distinguished chairman who decides in case of a tie) can be obtained. 
Can an eff ectivi ty function E: <!J>(N) -t qJl(qJl(S)) majorative iff for every 
coalition C with IC I>! IN I we have E(N) ~ E(C). Eis binary iff: 
XE E(N) and Kn YE E(N)==> XU YE E(0) 
Quite naturally, the first condition formalizes that a majority suffices to 
establish anything, and the second condition captures that there are only 
two alternatives to be chosen from. Note that if E is playable and 
majorative, Eis also maximal and furthem1ore X E E(N) =* X </. E(C) for 
I C\<!\Nl. 
Proposition 4: An effectivity junction E: <!fl(N) ~ el>(el>(S)) Ct.~corresponds 
to a two.alternative majority \IOte G = (N, {2:1 I i EN}, o, S) if! E is 
playable, majorative and binary. 
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Proof: It is easily verified that the a:-effectivity function of any two-
alternative majority vote is majorative and binary. For the other 
direction, Jet E be any playable, majorative and binary effectivity 
function. By playability, E = E(; for some strategic game G. We shall 
construct a two-alternative majority vote G' such that E = E(; = E0,. 
In case the outcome state in G is always the same states, constructing 
G' is trivial. So assume there are at least two outcomes s1, s2 ES which 
actually occur in G. Then simply define G' = (N, {l:; I i E N}, o, S) with 
l:; ={yes, no} and o(cr) = s1 if I {er; I er;= yes} I>! IN I and o(a-) = s2 
otherwise. Observe first that since E is binary, G cannot result in an 
outcome other than s1 or s2: from {s1} E E(N) and {s2} E E(N) we can 
conclude that {s1, s2} E £(0). It remains to show that Ee= E0,. 
If X E E&(C) = E(C), there are three possibilities: (i) {s1, s2} ~ X, in 
which case X E E(;,(C) holds trivially. (ii) s2 It' X, and so s1 EX. Then 
I C I > ! I NI , for otherwise since E is majorative, X (j. E(N), contra-
dicting the fact that {.1·2} E E(N). So since C forms a majority, 
X E £ 0,(C). (iii) s1 tft X, analogously. 
For the other direction, if X EE(;,( C), we can distinguish the same 
three cases: (i) {s1, s2} ~ X, in which case monotonicity and 
{s1, s2} E £(0) establish that X E E( C). (ii) s2 ~ X, and so s1 EX. Then 
C must be a majority, and so by majorativity, X E E(C). (iii) s1 (j. X, 
analogously. D 
Defining a democratic binary procedure as a partial function which 
associates two-alternative majority votes to nonterminal states, we 
obtain the following: 
Corollary 3: An e.ff'ectf\lffy fi'ame :1J' = (S, E) et-corresponds to a demo-
cratic binary procedure ijj' for every slate s r/. SJ., E(s) is playable, 
mC(jorat ive and binary. 
Since playable majorative effectivity functions are also maximal, 
Proposition 1 applies to democracies as well. 
IV. SOME APPLICATIONS 
IV. J. Modelling dynamic procedures: voting 
Consider a political body N = {I, 2, 31 4, 5, 6} which has to decide on 
passing a new law. First, a subcommittee D = {2, 3, 4} has to decide (by 
majority) which precise version of the law is to be presented to the full 
political body. Subsequently, the whole political body decides whether 
the law is passed or not. Again, the majority of the votes decides, and in 
case of a draw, the vote of the chairman 1 is decisive. If the law (as 
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proposed by committee D) is not passed, the initiative is returned to 
committee D which has to make a new proposal for the law, and the 
process repeats itself. 
We assume for simplicity that there are only two versions of the law 
which are under discussion, version l and version 2. If the body N rejects 
the proposal of committee D, the committee can either decide to propose 
the other version of the law, or it can resubmit its original proposal, 
possibly resulting in a stalemate which may tum into an infinite loop 
(some might claim that this model is sufficiently realistic to capture the 
essentials of the legislative process in some countries). Figure 3 depicts 
the situation as a tree. 
The situation described is easily seen to be an extensive game with 
simultaneous moves. One can think of the situation described in terms of 
coalitional effectivity as follows: soEcX holds iff at state so, coalition C 
can force the local voting outcome to lie in set X, i.e. iff one of the 
following two conditions is met: (1) {t, u} n X=f 0 and IC n DI> 1, or 
(2) {t, u} ~ X. Analogous definitions can be given for tEcX and uEcX. 
incorporating the special role of the chaim1an. 
We can also use this example to illustrate global, partial and total 
effectivity. Figure 4 displays some interesting examples which demon-
strate the unequal powers of four 3-player coalitions at the initial state so. 
Note that both {1, 2, 3} and {I, 4, 5} can globally maintain {s(), t, u}; 
i.e. they have the power to keep the process going forever, never reaching 
any decision. On the other hand, { 1, 4, 5} cannot force a particular 
version of the law to be passed, whereas {2, 3, 4} does have at least 
partial power to do so: If some mechanism in the legislative process 
would rule out an infinite stalemate, this coalition can guarantee any 
outcome; still, it is unable to rule out such an infinite stalemate on its 
by majority of D 
by majority of N 
Fig. 3. An example of binary majority voting with subcommittees 
coalition/ Btates {s1} s-i, s2} {so, t,u} 
{1,2,3} t t g 
{2,3,4} 11 p 
{l,4,5} t g 
{4,5,6} 
Fig. 4. Global (g), total (t) and partial (p} e!Tectivity in the voting example of 
Fig. 3 state so 
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own; i.e. it is partially but not totally effective for {s1} as well as for {s2}. 
Thus, the following partial effectivity order of these four three-player 
coalitions emerges: 
{4, 5, 6} < {2, 3, 4}, {l, 4, 5} < {l, 2, 3}. 
IV.2. Local vs. global properties 
The different kinds of effectivity frames associated, for example, with 
extensive games and democracies have been defined in terms of local 
requirements; i.e. properties which the local effectivity functions had to 
satisfy. Some of these properties will be maintained globally or 
terminally, some will not. One can show, for example, that for games 
without infinite plays, the total ( = partial) effectivity function is 
playable. 
Proposition 5: If ~ = (S, E). a-corresponds to an extensive game and 
s E E0(S), then E1(s} is p/ayctble. 
Proof' The playability conditions can be checked 011e-by-011e; we only 
show N-maxima_!!ty and superadditivity. Ifs(/. E~(X), since s E E~(S), 
we haves~ E~(X) by Proposition I; i.e. s E E'/t(SJ. n X) = Ejy(X). 
For superadditivity, we show generally that for all C1 n C2 = 0 we 
have E~.1 (Xi) n Eb (X2) ~ E~·1 u c (Xi n X2); we proceed again by trans-
finite induction as in the proof of Proposition. Let: 
Fi(Y) = (S.1 n X1) u Ec,(Y) 
F2(Y) = (Sl. n X2) U Ec2(Y) 
F3( Y) = (Sl. n x, n X2) u Ee, u C2( Y). 
We show that F1 j"' n F2 T /'i. k F3 T "'· The heart of the proof is the 
inductive step for r;;+ 1, where one can check that: 
((S.L n X1) u Ec1(F1 T n:)) n ((S.L n X2) u Ec2(F2 T tt)) 
is a subset of 
(S.L n x, n X1) u Ee, uc2CF3 T n;). 
The only two cases possible are s E (S1 n X1) n (SJ. n X2) and 
s E Ec1 (Fi T n~) n Ec2(F2 T /'i.). The latter case makes use of the super-
additivity of E. 0 
Consequently, for every extensive game G without infinite plays, there 
is a strategic game G' such that the total effectivity function of G is the a-
effectivity function of G1 • In fact, one such strategic game G1 is simply 
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the strategic normal form of G (see Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994). Note 
also that the global effectivity function E* is not playable: In the simple 
one-player game where at the initial state s, the player has only one 
possible move resulting in a final state t, E* is not N-maximal: neither 
sE~(SJ.) nor sE1;(Sl.) holds. 
Considering democracy as a further example, while the binary aspect 
of a democratic binary procedure may be lost globally, the democratic 
aspect is maintained: If E is majorative at every state of an effectivity 
frame, then so is E', so a democratic procedure will maintain democracy 
overall. That the converse is not true can be gathered from the extensive 
game in Figure 5 where at the initial state, E' is majorative while E is 
not. 
IV.3. Realization problems 
Given a particular effectivity function, one may ask whether it can be 
implemented or realized by means of a particular procedure. An agenda 
setter might be interested to find out whether a given power distribution 
can be realized by a (democratic) voting procedure of a particular kind. 
More abstractly, given a strategic game G with its associated a-effectivity 
function E'(;, one might want to know whether there is an extensive game 
without simultaneous moves G' such that Eh, = Eg. 
As a very simple example of a realization problem using a:-effectivity, 
consider again the strategic game form G of Figure 1. Since there is no 
extensive game G' without simultaneous moves such that E~, = E~. 
there can also be no extensive game with a reduced strategic fonn 
equivalent to G. In contrast, if we replace s4 by s3, the extensive game G1 
of Figure 6 satisfies E~, = Eg (player 1 plays rows, player 2 columns) 
and has an equivalent reduced strategic form. 
In general, the target effectivity function does not need to be specified 
completely, one may only be interested that it meets certain criteria such 
as being majorative. This suggests that the realization problem can be 
considered as a generalization of the program synthesis problem; i.e. of 
finding a program which meets a given specification. Thus, in the one-
player case, the realizing effectivity frame is a process satis-





a b c a b c 
Fig. 5. A game which is majorative te1111i11ally but not locally 
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Fig. 6. An extensive game without simultaneous moves 
1 2 1\2 l r 
/"'--~ 1\2 r ........... ~ .. ll a a 
a 2 l a a 1 1 lr a c 
~~ 7' b c A n~ rl b a b c I). l> a c TT b c 
Fig. 7. Two extensive gitmes 
The question, whether the a-effectivity function of a strategic game can 
be realized by an extensive game, is closely related to a question that has 
received some attention in the game theory literature (see e.g., Abdou, 
1998). For which strategic game forms does there exist an extensive game 
fonn (of perfect infom1ation, without simultaneous moves) with the same 
reduced strategic form? Two strategic games with the same reduced 
strategic fo1m have the same a-effectivity function while the converse does 
nol hold, as the two extensive gm11es in Figure 7 show. 
The table to the right of each game represents its (reduced) strategic 
form. From the perspective of a-effectivity, both extensive games are the 
same, whereas the strategic form of the game on the right reveals that player 
I has strategic options unavailable to him in the game on the left. In the 
right game, player 1 has a strategy /r which guarantees him either outcome 
a or outcome c. From the point of view of a-effectivity, this strategy is 
negligible given that he has a 'stronger' strategy ll which guarantees 
outcome a. Still, player I may prefer strategy lr which forces {ci, c} to 
strategy ll which forces {a} if he strictly prefers c to a. So from a perspective 
which includes prefere11ces, one may not want to identify the two games. 
V. A LOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
V.J. Syntax and semantics 
Coalition logic, introduced in Pauly (2000), provides a formal system to 
reason about effectivity frames. The formula [CJcp is true at a state 
prnvided that coalition C is locally effective for achieving a state where cp 
holds. In this paper, I extend the purely modal system by adding a new 
operator for global effectivity: [C*]cp is true at a state if coalition C is 
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globally effective for <p. The resulting logic can be viewed as a generalized 
multiplayer version of the game logic proposed by Parikh (1985). 
Given the set of agents N, we define the syntax of coalition logic as 
follows. Given a set of atomic propositions ~o. a formula <p can have the 
following syntactic fom1: 
cp == J_ IP I -icp I cp v cp I [qcp I [C*]i,o 
where p E <Do and C ~ N. We define T, /\, -7 and ~as usual: T :=-d .. , 
cp /\ 1/J := -t(-i<p V ..,'If;), ip --'I 1/J := ....,cp v 1/J and r.p +-+ 1/J := ( ip ~ 1/J) f\ ( 1/J-7 cp). 
In case C = { i}, we write [z]ip instead of [ { i} ]cp. Furthermore, we define 
tenninal effectivity in terms of global effectivity as is to be expected given 
the semantic definitions of E1 and EP, i.e. we use the following 
abbreviations: 
O' J.. := Ac!:: N....,[ C1T 
[ CP]cp := [ C*]{ 'P v ....,(]' J..) 
[ C1]ip :=...., [C*J ...., ( 'P A a J..) 
Note that the definition of [C1]ip relies on Proposition l which applies 
only to regular and maximal frames, but since all of the frames we will be 
dealing with in our applications fall into that category, we can cut back 
on the number of primitive operators. 
An effectivity model .AIL= (S, E, V) consists of an effectivity frame 
<JJ; = (S, E) and a valuation for the propositional letters V: c;J?0 ~ '!P(S'). 
Given such a model, truth of a formula in a model at a state is defined as 
follows: 
M, s ~ l.. 
.iLl,sf=p 
.M., s I= -1(p 
.M., s I== cp v 4; 
.M., .I' I= [ C]ip 
.M., s I= [ C*]ip 
iff p E filo and s E V(p) 
iff .M., s ~ cp 
iff .M., sf: <p or .M., s I= tj; 
iff sEc<p'11 
iff sE~<p.tt 
where cpM. = {s ES I .AA., s I= ip }. A formula r.p is valid in .M. iff cp.M. = S, and 
r.p is valid iff r.p is valid in all effectivity models. A set of formulas w is 
satisfiable iff there is a model .M. for which nwe ill tf;.M. =I= 0. 
V.2. Applications 
The purpose of this seclion is to show how the three applications 
illustrated in Section IV can all be translated into logical questions of 
model checking, validity and satisfiability. 
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Reconsidering first the voting procedure of Section IV. I, one can easily 
trnnslate the facts about global and terminal effectivity into our logical 
language. Let .M. = (S, E, V) be the model which captures the procedure 
depicted in Figure 3, where <I>o == {PI, p2, q} and V(p1) ={sf}, and 
V(q) ={so, t, u}. Then at the initial state, .M., so\= [{1, 2, 3} 1]p1 /\ 
[{l,2,3} 1]p2/\({l,2,3}*]q; i.e. the coalition {l,2,3} can achieve any 
possible outcome as well as a stalemate, whereas the coalition {l, 4, 5} 
is weaker, .M., so I= [{ 1, 4, 5} ']( p 1 V P2) but .M., so It [ { 1, 4, 5} 'lP1 V 
[{ l, 4, 5} 1]p2. Furthermore, .M, so I= [ {I, 4, 5} *]q, so this coalition can 
block any law from getting passed. Even weaker, coalition {4, 5, 6} has 
virtually no power, since its counter-coalition { 1 , 2, 3} is all-powerful. Thus, 
these facts about truth in a given model are the logical analogue of Figure 4. 
As for the logical analogue of Proposition 5, the preservation of local 
properties on the global level, observe that the four playability 
conditions for E' can be translated into the logical language: 
(..L) -,[C']..L 
(T) [N]T----? [ C1]T 
(N) [N]T-7 (...,[QJt]-u.p-+ [N1](fl) 
(S) ([C11]i.p1 I\ [q]i.p2)-+ [{C1 U C2) 1](ip1 /\ <p2) 
where C1 n C2 = 0. 
Note that the antecedent of axioms {T) and (N) is necessary to handle 
terminal stales where no coalition is effective for anything. All four 
axiom schemas are valid for extensive games without infinite plays. 
Similarly, the majorativity condition can be translated into: 
[N1]ip----? [ C1]ip 
where I C I > ! I NI , and can be shown to be valid for majorative 
effectivity frames. 
Lastly, the realization problem of' Section IV.3 can be formulated 
axiomatically as well. We exmnine again the strategic game G of Figure I 
with N = {I, 2} and its associated l.~·effectivity function E'(;. We use 
<Po ={a, b, c, d} for the outcomes of the game and specify that the 
outcomes are mutually exclusive, complele and hold only at terminal states: 
[0 *] (a --7 -ib /\ -ic f\ -.cQ 
[0*] (h-> -.a/\ -ic f\ -.d) 
(0 *] (C-7 ...,Cl/\ -ib /\ -id) 
[0*] (d-+ -.a/\ -ib /\ -.c) 
[QJ *] (O' J. ~(a v b v c v d)). 
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Next, we require that all outcomes are possible in the game: 
[N']a A [N1]b A [N1]c A [N1]d 
and that there are no i11finite plays allowed: 
(0 1]T 
Finally, we specify the target effectivity function of the strategic game: 
[l 1](a V b) /\[I 1](c V d) A [2 1](a v c) A [2 1](b V d). 
Let b. be the set consisting of these eight axioms. Then b. is satisfiable by 
an extensive game without simultaneous moves iff E'(; is realized by this 
game. Hence, b. is not satisfiable by an extensive game without 
simultaneous moves. On the other hand, considering G' with S4 being 
replaced by s3 in G and substituting c for din the axioms appropriately 
yielding the set b.', the extensive game of Figure 6 satisfies !:::..'. 
VI. METATHEORY 
The concern of the present paper has been mainly semantic in nature. I 
introduced a class of models and discussed various well-known 
subclasses, also showing how these models can be used to model 
scenarios of multiagent interaction and what new questions are raised. 
On the logical side, there are a number of metatheoretic questions which 
should be mentioned. In Pauly (2000), the modal base logic (i.e. coalition 
logic without [C*]cp) has been studied from a more logical perspective. 
As has been suggested in the previous section, the playability conditions 
can be translated into our logical language yielding an axiomatization 
which can be shown to be complete for the class of extensive games with 
simultaneous moves. Work is in progress on extending this axiomatiza-
tion to the logic with [C*Jcp. Furthermore, the satisfiability problem for 
the modal base logic was shown to be PSPACE·complete, and hence it is 
just as complex us the normal modal logic K. In contrast, introducing an 
iteration construct such as [C*]cp usually increases the complexity of the 
satisfiability problem. In the case of propositional dynamic logic (Harel, 
1984; Kozen and Tiuryn, 1990), the satisfiability problem is exponential-
time complete, and I conjecture that the same is true for coalition logic. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
For the computer scientist, the work presented in this paper should 
provide an interesting generalization of work initiated by Dijkstra (1976) 
011 partial and total program correctness. Moving from programs to 
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multiplayer processes, one gets a better picture of the assumptions 
needed to establish various connections between partial and total 
correctness (Proposition I). For the game-theorist on the other hand, the 
distinction between partial and total effectivity provides the conceptual 
tool to analyse situations where certain coalitions have the power to 
force an impasse through infinite looping. Furthennore, I hope to have 
shown that effectivity frames are a useful model for dynamic processes 
and raise some new questions as well. The fact that a logic can be 
associated to these effectivity frames provides not only a conceptual link 
between game theory and logic, but also an algorithmic approach to 
solving game-theoretic questions. 
Besides the open metatheoretic questions mentioned, there are also 
game-theoretic questions which lend Lhemselves for future work. The 
literature on effectivity functions knows various concepts of effectivity 
which differ from the notion of cr-effectivity employed here. The general 
approach adopted here equally well applies to these other notions such 
as /3-effectivity, since effectivity frames, global and terminal effectivity 
are not fomrnlly tied to any particular notion of effectivity. 
More fundamental still, the present logic does not allow one to talk 
about players' preferences. Put differently, we can only express what 
players and coalitions can achieve, not what they want to achieve. 
Moving from the possible to the desirable is needed in order to 
incorporate various solution concepts such as the core so that we can 
eventually add predicates such as Core( cp) expressing that <p holds at all 
states/outcomes in the core. To add preferences, one can add a standard 
modal accessibility relation for each player together with a new modal 
operator Pref;( <p) which says that at all states prefen-ed by i, <p holds. It 
remains to be seen wheLher such a modal operator is sufficient to 
formalize various solution concepts, for it may turn out that a richer 
fragment of first-order logic is needed to compare preferences globally. 
On a more applied note, examples such as the legislative procedure 
given in Section IV. l suggest looking at more realistic cases of 
poliLical/social processes where coalition formation is involved. As 
shown by, for example, Yannucci (2000), effectivity functions can play a 
role in such ai1 analysis, and it would be interesting to see how effectivity 
frames and coalition logic could be useful here. 
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